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ABSTRACT 
 
Stealing to Survive? 
Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France* 
 
Using local administrative data from 1826 to 1936, we document the evolution of crime rates 
in 19th century France and we estimate the impact of a negative income shock on crime. Our 
identification strategy exploits the phylloxera crisis. Between 1863 and 1890, phylloxera 
destroyed about 40% of French vineyards. We use the geographical variation in the timing of 
this shock to identify its impact on property and violent crime rates, as well as minor offences. 
Our estimates suggest that the phylloxera crisis caused a substantial increase in property 
crime rates and a significant decrease in violent crimes. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory and casual observation both suggest that economic crises may favour 
criminal activity as they alter the opportunity costs to engage into crime. At the same time, 
higher crime rates are likely to have a negative impact on economic conditions as the 
prevalence of crime in an area discourages business. Thus, negative income shocks may 
trigger a vicious circle between deteriorating economic conditions and crime. Although this 
relation seems to be quite intuitive, it is far from easy to document due to standard 
endogeneity problems. In order to single out the causal impact of negative shocks to the 
economy on crime rates, ideally we would like to observe a comparable set of countries or 
administrative units within a country over a long period of time and we would like to treat 
randomly some of them inducing negative economic shocks. On top of such an ideal 
experiment we would like to have reliable data on crime rates with both time and spatial 
variation. In this paper, we claim that 19th century France provides such an ideal setting. 
To identify the impact of a negative economic shock on crime, we take advantage of the 
phylloxera crisis that burst in France in the second half of the 19th century. The phylloxera 
(an aphid which attacks vines' roots) destroyed about 40 per cent of vines in France, thus 
inducing a large productivity shock in an economy still largely dependent on agricultural 
production1. According to historical research, this turned into a major income shock for a 
number of reasons. First, the decrease in wine production was not matched, by far, by an 
equivalent increase in wine prices. Second, the reduction in wine-generated income did not 
trigger a substantial substitution of wine for other agricultural products. Eventually, in some 
départements,2 the crisis was so strong as to induce a partial collapse of the local credit 
system (Postel Vinay, 1989), thus preventing any smoothing of the crisis. In the absence of 
welfare state, a large share of the population suffered a major income drop.  
                                                 
1
 Wine represented on average 17% of agricultural production. 
2
 The départements are geographical and administrative units roughly equal in size to a US county. 
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The phylloxera crisis started in 1863 when the aphid first appeared in Southern France and 
ended in the 1890s when vineyards were replanted with hybrid American vines which were 
resistant to the insect. As phylloxera affected the different départements in different years, we 
exploit the spatial variation in the timing of the shock to identify its effect on crime rates. The 
massive negative shock to the French economy induced by the phylloxera attack is indeed an 
ideal natural experiment that helps solving the major identification problems related to reverse 
causality and confounding factors. To the best of our knowledge, the only article exploiting 
the source of exogenous variation in income induced by the phylloxera epidemic is Banerjee 
et al. (2010) who show that children who were in utero in families involved in wine 
production in years where their region was affected by phylloxera ended up being 
significantly shorter at 20 years old than children conceived either before or after phylloxera. 
Our analysis uses uniquely rich data on criminal records collected between 1826 and 1936 by 
the French Ministry of Justice at the département level. These data represent, to the best of 
our knowledge, the oldest national official administrative crime record exploited by 
researchers up to today. They allow us to identify the impact of the crisis triggered by the 
phylloxera epidemic on violent and property crimes, as well as on minor offences. This 
exercise is unique from a historical perspective since comparable datasets were collected only 
starting in the 20th century in other countries (e.g. the Uniform crime report in the USA starts 
being compiled in the 1930s) or for a shorter period of time in some German states like 
Bavaria and Prussia (see Mehlum et al., 2006 and Traxler and Burhop, 2010).  
Our results show that the phylloxera crisis caused a strong increase in property crimes and a 
significant decrease in violent crimes.  
 5 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of negative economic shocks on crime in 
a historical perspective by covering more than eighty French départements over 1826-1936.3 
It is one of the very first exercises of this kind in economic history. To the best of our 
knowledge, only a couple of papers resort to historical data to study the impact of changing 
economic conditions on crime. Mehlum et al. (2006) estimate the impact of an increase in 
poverty on crime in 19th century Bavaria. The authors use rainfall as an instrumental variable 
for rye prices and show that an increase in rye prices following bad weather conditions 
induces an increase in property crimes and leads to significantly fewer violent crimes. Traxler 
and Burhop (2010) replicate this exercise for Prussia and find similar results. With respect to 
Mehlum et al. (2006), it is worth noting that, although we cover a similar historical period, 
our research design has a number of advantages. We have observations for both our 
independent and dependent variables for each of the 87 French départements over the whole 
period of analysis. In contrast, Mehlum et al. (2006) use data on crime rates in seven Bavarian 
regions while they only have one single series of rainfall and rye price data for the whole of 
Bavaria. Moreover, while rainfall potentially affects both economic conditions and the 
probability of apprehension of criminals – since the cost of searching for criminals may be 
higher if weather conditions are bad – the phylloxera crisis affects incomes but is unlikely to 
have altered the cost of crime fighting and hence the probability of apprehension. 
A few papers in the literature exploit, as we do, natural experiments to analyse the impact of a 
negative income shock on criminal activity in today's economies. Miguel (2005) uses survey 
data on contemporary rural Tanzania to show that the killing of “witches” (i.e. old women) 
increases in times of extreme weather events leading to floods and droughts. Fafchamps and 
Minten (2006) exploit an exogenous cut in fuel supply in rural Madagascar following a 
disputed presidential election to identify the effects of a massive increase in poverty and 
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 See Data Appendix.   
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transport costs. Using original survey data collected in 2002 they find that crop thefts increase 
at times of rising poverty.  
Our study also relates to the literature on the effects of the business cycle on crime since the 
phylloxera crisis constituted a strong negative shock to the French economy. Consistent with 
our findings, this literature finds that trends in property crimes in the USA and France are 
countercyclical (Cook and Zarkin, 1985 and Lagrange, 2003). 
A recent literature on unemployment and crime finds results consistent with our main 
findings. These studies using panel data at the state or regional level (Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Oster and Agell, 2007; Lin, 2008; Buonanno and Montolio, 
2008; Fougère et al., 2009; Mocan and Bali, 2010)4 reach a consensus that increasing 
unemployment contributes to raise property crimes (although the magnitude is not large).  
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 provides some background information about the 
phylloxera pest and a conceptual framework. Section 3 presents the data sources and the main 
trends in crime rates in 19th century France. Section 4 describes the time-pattern of the effects 
of phylloxera and justifies the choice of our phylloxera indicator. Section 5 presents the 
results of regression analyses and Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
 
2.Historical and Theoretical Background 
2.1. Phylloxera and income shock 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the French economy was still very dependent on 
agriculture that represented a major source of income for many households. The share of 
agricultural production and extractive industry in GDP amounted to 38.5% in 1830, decreased 
to 33% in 1850 and was still as high as 28% in 1890 (Craft, 1984, p. 54). This made France 
                                                 
4
 A complete survey of this literature goes beyond the scope of this paper. Recent interesting surveys discussing 
results in criminology, public policy and economics are Paternoster and Bushway (2001) and Bushway (2011). 
 7 
much more dependent on agriculture than the United-Kingdom, for example, where the 
corresponding shares were respectively 24.9% in 1840 and 13.4% in 1890 (Craft, 1984, p. 
53). Wine production represented a large part of the value of agricultural production. In 1862, 
the year before phylloxera was first spotted in France, wine production amounted to about 
one-sixth of the value of agricultural production thus representing the second most important 
product after wheat. Any disease affecting French vineyards was therefore likely to represent 
a major shock to a mostly rural economy. Phylloxera turned out to be such a shock. 
"Phylloxera vastatrix" is a near-microscopic aphid that hangs on the roots of vines and sucks 
the sap. It originally lived in North America and did not reach Europe in the era of sailing 
ships since the journey took so long that upon arrival either the vine cuttings or the aphid on 
them had died. The steam power provided the greater speed necessary for the insect to survive 
the journey. Although it was harmless to grape vines in its original ecology, it proved 
devastator to European species, causing their death in a very short while (Simpson, 2011, 
p.36). French vineyards started to be affected in 1863 but it was not before 1868 that scientists 
identified its presence on dead roots in the Gard département. Until 1875, there was a fierce 
scientific debate as to the responsibility of phylloxera in vines death. Some scientists argued 
that it was the cause of the death whereas most of them claimed that it was a consequence of 
it: vines were dying because wine growers would not take good care of them and phylloxera 
was developing on dead vines (Pouget, 1990 and Gale, 2011).  
<Figure 1 about here> 
The insect progressively expanded across départements although this expansion was initially 
quite slow5 – see Figure 1 for the time pattern of the diffusion of phylloxera. By the middle of 
the 1870s, the aphid affected most départements in the Southeast of the country (Bouches du 
Rhône) and in the Bordeaux region. Its spreading pattern was very difficult to predict since 
                                                 
5
 See Garrier, 1989, chapter 3. 
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phylloxera spread either because it was carried by the wind or because it was hanging on an 
object or a plant which was carried around by human activity, including on long distances. 
Other factors also played a role. For example, its expansion in the Charente département was 
described as “nearly explosive” and greatly favoured by the heat and drought of 1875.6 So, 
even after 1875 when the origin of the pest was identified, farmers kept being surprised by its 
arrival in their area and sometimes denied it on the grounds that they were taking good care of 
their vines – Ordish, 1972, p. 134; Loubère, 1978, chapter 4.  
During that period, experts experimented with various treatments to fight against the pest 
from vineyard flooding to the use of chemical products. None of the treatments introduced 
proved to be effective until a botanist named Alexis Millardet showed in 1882 that vines 
could be made resistant to phylloxera by grafting European vines onto phylloxera-resistant 
American roots. It then took several years before people understood how to implement the 
grafting in order to produce drinkable wine. This was because not all types of US roots were 
suitable for the various types of French soils and wine species. In 1888 Pierre Viala came 
back from America having identified 431 types of American vines and selected those likely to 
be successfully grafted in France. This opened the way to the recovery which started in the 
early 1890s.7  
As it contaminated départements, phylloxera caused a huge decrease in wine production. 
According to our estimates – see section 5.1 – on average, full contagion of a département by 
phylloxera brought about a 35% reduction in wine production. As reported by Loubère (1978, 
p. 157), "there was no measure of the despair the southern vintner felt as he watched 
helplessly, obstinately unbelieving, while his vines faded and died".  
                                                 
6
 Gale, 2011, p. 152.  
7
 Paul, 1996, p. 113ff and Gale, 2011, chapter 4.  
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The sharp decline in wine production was not compensated by an equally strong increase in 
wine prices. In order to compensate for the decrease in the supply of French wine, French 
authorities relaxed both wine import rules and quality standards. Wine growers were allowed 
to sell "piquettes" or "second or third wine" – made by mixing press cakes with water, 
pressing it, adding sugar to the run and fermenting. They were also allowed to produce raisin 
wines, a beverage made out by soaking imported dried raisins and drawing off the liquid until 
the exhaustion of all of its sugar (Loubère, 1978, p. 166). According to Ordish (1972, tables 9-
11), the sum of imports, piquettes and raisin wine represented 58.6% of domestic wine 
production in 1889 and 61.5% in 1890 as compared to less than 0.5% in the 1860s.8 This large 
inflow of imports and wine substitutes together with the decrease in average wine quality kept 
the price of wine from increasing at the same pace as the decline in French production (see 
Ordish, 1972 and Figure 2 in Banerjee et al, 2010).  
So, the spread of phylloxera generated a major income shock. Contemporary estimates made 
by A. Lalande suggest that phylloxera cost France twice as much as the war indemnity paid to 
the Germans in 1870 which amounted to 25% of one-year GDP (see Occhino et al, 2008 and 
Ordish, 1972). More recently, Pierre Galet estimated that the cost could have been as high as 
15 billion francs, i.e. three times the war indemnity.9 The share of the value of wine 
production in GDP indeed went down from 6.84% in 1862 to 2.71% in 1890 while the share 
of départements affected by phylloxera increased from 0 to 71.3% – see Figure 2.  
<Figure 2 about here> 
                                                 
8
 Imports jumped from 0.2 million hectoliters in the 1860s to 10 millions in the 1880s. As a percentage of 
domestic wine production they rose from 0.3% in 1862 to 40% in 1890. Assessing precisely the volume of 
piquettes is more difficult. A lower bound can be estimated using the volume of sugar mixed with press cakes. 
This has been recorded because this sugar used to be subsidised by the State. Ordish (1972) suggests that 
piquettes could have amounted to 11% of regular wine production. As far as raisin wine is concerned, it 
represented at most 11% of domestic wine production over the period. 
9
 Cited in Simpson (2011), p. 36. 
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This decrease in wine-generated income did not trigger a substantial shift towards other 
agricultural products. The area planted with vines did not significantly decrease subsequent to 
the arrival of phylloxera (see Banerjee et al., 2010). Most areas planted with vines were 
indeed ill suited to other crops. Moreover, wine growers were reluctant to switch from a high 
value-added product to less lucrative crops, such as wheat for example – Loubère (1978, p. 
167). Most of them expected some cure to be found in the near future. Ordish (1972, p. 155) 
even argues that "there was a mystique attached to wine growing felt by the majority of small 
growers who found it difficult to envisage any other way of life".  
Given the size of the income shock in wine producing départements, the credit system itself 
partly collapsed thus preventing farmers from relying on borrowing to smooth out the crisis 
(Postel-Vinay, 1989). Central and local governments would not provide any financial help to 
compensate for the loss of income. Moreover, the only institutions in charge of poor relief, the 
so-called bureaux de bienfaisance, were charities organised on a local community basis which 
found themselves in great difficulty because of the crisis. The British consul at Bordeaux 
noticed in 1886 that "the number, more especially of the smaller class of proprietors on 
Medoc, in Sauterne and other départements of the Gironde who have been utterly ruined is 
considerable".10 Similarly, Arambourou (1958) summarises: "For many peasants, ruin was 
complete; for all of them the financial difficulty was considerable". 
2.2 Conceptual framework: income shock and crime 
In the rest of the paper we will provide estimates of how the phylloxera epidemic affected 
crime rates in the second half of the 19th century in France. Before moving to the empirical 
results it is worth discussing through which mechanisms the negative income shock triggered 
by the diffusion of phylloxera may have affected crime rates. The more general, underlying 
question is: how do economic crises and local negative income shocks affect individuals’ 
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 Cited in Ordish, 1972, p. 146.  
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choices with respect to criminal activity? Property crimes and violent crimes may respond to 
different factors which we discuss separately in the following.  
According to the standard economic model of crime (Becker, 1968), individuals choose 
between criminal and legal activities on the basis of the expected utility of each. In this simple 
framework, returns to legal activity are determined by market earnings (wages for salaried 
workers and profits for the self-employed) whereas returns to illegal activity depend on the 
potential payoff of crime and the expected sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system. 
Expected sanctions are an increasing function of the probability of getting caught and of legal 
punishment if caught. Individuals will choose to engage in criminal activities (or increase 
their involvement at the margin) if the expected return to criminal activity outweighs the 
expected return to legal activities - see Ehrlich (1973) and Cook et al. (2013). This simple 
framework is helpful to pin down the potential effects of the economic crisis triggered by the 
phylloxera epidemic.  
The drop in income caused by the contraction of wine production may have affected 
individual decisions regarding property crimes through different channels. First, it is likely to 
have reduced the expected return to legal activities either because of an increase in the 
probability of being unemployed and/or via a reduction in wages for employees working in 
the wine industry and/or because of the decrease in wine-based revenues for self-employed 
wine-growers. If unemployment increased during the economic crisis triggered by phylloxera, 
the model proposed by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) suggests that the time allocation of 
individuals is likely to have been modified in favour of income-generating criminal activities. 
The model predicts criminal behaviour as a function of potential earnings on the legal labour 
market relative to the returns to property crimes and preferences over income and nonmarket 
time. In this framework, unemployment increases the time devoted to criminal activities for 
those who already engaged in property crime while working on the legal labour market. For 
 12 
workers who did not engage in crime before being unemployed, whether or not they should 
commit property crimes as a result of unemployment depends on whether the return to one 
hour spent on criminal activities exceeds their reservation wage. Individuals with high 
reservation wages are unlikely to commit property crimes as a result of an unemployment 
spell. In contrast, individuals with low reservation wages are more likely to reallocate time 
towards property crime in order to compensate for the loss of income due to unemployment.11 
As a matter of fact, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) find that an increase in unemployment 
raises property crimes both at the intensive and extensive margins. Evidence from 
contemporary data suggests that property crime rates also respond to decreases in unskilled 
workers' wages since they  reduce the expected return on legal activities (Machin and Meghir, 
2004). Based on these theoretical considerations, we expect the strong negative income shock 
triggered by phylloxera to have increased the relative incentives to commit property crimes as 
compared to engage in legal income-generating activities. Beyond affecting the expected 
return to legal activities, phylloxera also reduced the quality and quantity of wine production 
potentially targeted by criminals. More generally, it is likely to have lowered the quality and 
quantity of other sources of illegal incomes, thereby reducing the expected payoff from 
property crimes. So, the economic downturn generated by the spread of phylloxera has 
modified the relative gains from legal versus illegal income-generating activities in a 
potentially ambiguous way. Moreover, the decision to engage in criminal activity does not 
only depend on the relative gains from criminal vs non-criminal activities. It also depends on 
the probability of apprehension and on the severity of court sentences. Both may also have 
                                                 
11
 Criminologists – see e.g. Cantor and Land (1985;1991) - have argued that things may go the other way round 
so that high unemployment during economic downturns may result in a reduction in crime rates. Based on the 
"routine activities" theory the argument goes as follows: immediately after losing their job, the unemployed are 
less likely to visit public places where the risk of being victimised is greater and they are more likely to spend 
time guarding their homes thus reducing the risk that they be burgled. Recent empirical evidence reporting a 
positive relationship between unemployment and crime suggests that other forces such as the reduction in the 
opportunity cost of engaging in income-generating criminal activities tend to compensate the potential 
reallocation of time in favour of home-based activities. A detailed discussion of these aspects can be found in 
Paternoster and Bushway (2001). 
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been affected by the income shock generated by phylloxera. In particular, local tax revenues 
may have decreased following the fall in income, triggering a reduction in the number of 
police forces and/or in their endowments. This may, in turn, have reduced the probability of 
apprehending criminals.12 The severity of court sentences may also have decreased if judges 
became more lenient because they were conscious that making a living out of legal income 
opportunities had become more difficult.13  
All in all, the potential effect of negative income shocks in general, and of the phylloxera 
crisis in particular, on property crime rates is theoretically ambiguous. In the rest of the paper, 
we describe and estimate the effects of the income shock triggered by the diffusion of 
phylloxera taking into account the potential existence of different channels of impact. Our 
historical data do not allow us to quantify the effect of each channel separately, but the sign of 
the point estimates on the phylloxera variable in our regressions allows us to determine 
whether the negative effect of the income shock on legitimate labour income opportunities 
outweighs the potential negative effects of the economic downturn on illegal market income 
and on expected sanctions. In order to make sure that changes in expected sanctions are not 
the main driver of our results, we control in some specifications for the local presence of 
police forces and we check that phylloxera did not significantly affect conviction rates. 
As regards the effect of the phylloxera epidemic on violent crimes, theoretical predictions are 
clearer. To the extent that alcohol is a normal good, as local income decreased, alcohol 
consumption is likely to have decreased too. There is evidence in the contemporary literature 
that alcohol consumption has criminogenic effects in today's economies (e.g. Cook and 
Moore, 1993; and Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011). If this was already the case in 19th century 
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 In the specific context of 19th century France, this effect should be less of a concern however. The number and 
availability of police forces was indeed mainly determined at the national level so that it was not very sensitive 
to local economic conditions. 
13
 Ichino et al. (2003), for instance, show that Italian labour judges are more likely to decide in favour of workers 
whenever local unemployment is higher. 
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France, as alcohol consumption went down following phylloxera, violent crimes should have 
decreased as well. However, the impact of drinking on crime is likely to depend on 
consumption habits and social norms which may vary over time – see Felson et al. (2011). It 
is thus worth considering what criminologists and other social scientists thought at that time. 
In the second half of the 19th century, an important literature underlined the key role of 
alcohol consumption in generating violent crimes in France. Emile Levasseur, a professor of 
geography at Collège de France, wrote, for example, "A lot of wine, a lot of drunkards; as a 
consequence many violent acts, assaults and battery. M. Lacassagne provided evidence of this 
relation by comparing the evolution of some crimes with that of wine production. He even 
sees a relation between the number of violent crimes and election years such as 1865 and 
1876 in which taverns have got more clients than usual and he adds that the same thing has 
been noticed in England." (Levasseur, 1891, p. 442).14 Similar accounts of how alcohol 
consumption affects violence and hence criminality are provided by criminologists (see 
Lombroso, 1887, Tarde, 1903 and Yvernès, 1912), medical scholars (Jolly, 1865) and even 
engineers (Jacquet, 1912). Following this literature, if the phylloxera epidemic lowered wine 
consumption, it is likely to have reduced violent crimes too. We show in Section 5 that this is 
actually what happened. In the discussion of our results, we also provide evidence that alcohol 
consumption and violent crimes are positively associated at the national level.  
 
3. Data  
3.1 Crime and police forces 
Since the very beginning of the 19th century, the French judicial system was highly 
centralised. France was a Roman-law country where the Napoleonic codes were the basis of 
criminal and civil law (Carbasse, 2000). Starting in 1826, the French Ministry of Justice 
                                                 
14
 Translated from French by the authors. 
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published a statistical yearbook entitled the Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle. It was 
based on reporting by local court public prosecutors and clerks. We hand-collected data from 
this source. 
The Compte Général was one of the most continuous and reliable sources in France at that 
time (Lohdi and Tilly, 1973, p. 299-300). It has been used as a model to set up criminal 
statistical records in several countries (see Perrot and Robert, 1989). Since its first 
publication, the Compte was assigned a double role. It was a management tool that was 
designed to help the government assess the working of the law and the effects of legal 
reforms. But, beyond policy makers, it was also supposed to provide information to moralists 
and thinkers. As such, it contributed to the birth of criminology. Although the Compte was 
published yearly until 1982, we only collected data for the period from 1826 to 1936. As 
underlined by Perrot and Robert (1989) the quality of the data indeed declined after the 1930s, 
in particular due to the decrease in the funding awarded to the judiciary system to collect 
statistical information. 
The Compte provides detailed information on the number of people charged and acquitted of 
violent crimes, property crimes and minor offences in each département every year (see 
Figure 3 for crimes – a similar table is available for minor offences). Violent crimes include 
homicides, sexual assaults, injuries, violence against children, abortion, plotting, rebellion and 
false witnesses. Property crimes encompass thefts, robberies, counterfeiting, corruption, 
destruction, fires and pillaging. As regards minor offences, they include a large range of 
offences considered as less serious than crimes and judged by magistrates' courts rather than 
by people’s juries as is the case for crimes. They include damages to public monuments, 
threats, involuntary homicides or wounds, minor thefts, harvest destruction, illegal practice of 
birth giving etc. Information about detailed crime and offence categories is not available at the 
département level. Nonetheless, the Compte provides data on the number of people accused of 
 16 
a number of more precisely defined crimes such as: homicides, thefts in churches, on country 
roads, domestic thefts and other thefts for a more limited period of time.15 Using the 
population provided by the Census16 for each département, we compute yearly crime rates 
defined as the ratio of the number of people accused to the population, broken down by type 
of crimes and offences, in each département. Given the poor quality of population data during 
war years, we drop years 1870-71 and 1914-1918 from our sample (see Data Appendix 1). 
Overall, the largest sample for which we have information for either property or violent 
crimes or minor offences contains 8,847 observations over 1826-1936. For other crime 
categories, sample size varies across category from 8,847 (1826-1936) to 7,208 (1826-1912) - 
see Data Appendix 3.  
<Figure 3 about here> 
Figures 4 and 5 report crime rates aggregated at the national level for the period 1826-1936. 
<Figure 4 about here> 
<Figure 5 about here> 
We also compute conviction rates for each type of crime and offence by dividing the number 
of people convicted by the number of people accused in each département every year. The 
corresponding rates vary from 64% for violent crimes to 72% for property crimes and 91% for 
minor offences – see Appendix Table A1.  
Finally, the Compte also provides information on police forces. More precisely, we know the 
yearly number of urban and rural policemen, superintendents, forest wardens and guardsmen 
                                                 
15
 Homicides and all thefts are available over the entire period, while thefts on country roads, domestic thefts and 
other thefts are available for 1826-1923 and thefts in churches for 1826-1912 only. 
16
 Census data are available every five years only. In order to get yearly data for population at the département 
level, we interpolate Census data using growth rates of population between Census years - see Data appendix.  
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in each court-of-appeal jurisdiction between 1843 and 1932.17 We compute an indicator of the 
presence of police forces defined as the ratio of the total number of police forces divided by 
the population in each court-of-appeal jurisdiction. Over the period we study, there were on 
average 3 members of police forces for 1,000 inhabitants in France (see Appendix Table A1).  
3.2. Phylloxera, wine production and wine intensity  
We collected data on the presence of phylloxera starting from information provided in Galet, 
(1957). The book reports both the year when phylloxera was first spotted in at least one 
municipality of each département and the year when the département was fully contaminated 
(i.e. all municipalities of the département were affected).18 Phylloxera had been spotted in 
3.3% of the 87 French départements in 1865 whereas this figure amounted to 50.5% in 1880 
and 71.3% in 1890 – see also Figure 1. The first département to be totally affected by 
phylloxera was Vaucluse in 1875. This was the case of 17% of all départements in 1880.  
Data on wine production are also drawn from Galet (1957). In our dataset, the number of 
hectolitres of wine produced is available for all départements between 1850 and 1905. Wine 
was produced in 79 out of the 87 French départements in 1862 – i.e. the year before 
phylloxera was first spotted in France.  
Using information provided by the 1862 Agriculture Survey, we compute a measure of wine 
intensity in the various départements before phylloxera was first spotted in France. We 
compute the share of wine in agricultural production as of 1862: it is larger than 15% in 39 
départements. We also use data on the surface planted in vines per inhabitant in 1862: the 
French average is as high as 0.07 ha (see Appendix Table A1). Using the 1861 census we also 
                                                 
17
 See Gillis (1989, pp. 315-6) for a presentation of the different types of police forces. In the Compte, the data 
are actually available at the court (i.e. infra-département) level for 1843-1862, at the département level for 1879-
1885 and at the court-of-appeal level for 1863-1878 and 1886-1932. We aggregate them at the court-of-appeal 
level for all years between 1843 and 1932. There were 27 courts of appeal in France in 1826. 
18
 This information is missing for 2 départements: Ardèche and Creuse. So, over the 1826-1936 period, the 
number of observations for which we have information on phylloxera is 8,639. 
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compute the share of people employed in agriculture at the départment level. We use these 
variables in specifications in which we allow the impact of phylloxera on crime rates to vary 
according to the importance of wine-related activities in each département as of 1862. 
3.3 Socio-economic characteristics and urbanisation 
When estimating the average impact of phylloxera on crime rates, we include socio-
demographic controls in some specifications. Using the data from the Statistique Générale de 
la France available for 1851-1911, we compute the ratio of males in the département 
population. We also control for the age structure of the male population, i.e. the ratio of males 
aged 15-19, 20-29, 30-39 and 40 years old and above. Since these data come from the Census 
which is available every 5 years only, we regress a 5-year moving average of crime rates on a 
5-year moving average of our phylloxera indicator and the socio-demographic variables.19 
We use a similar specification when controlling for urbanisation. The data come from the 
INED-Urbanisation database and are also available for Census years only.20 We compute the 
proportion of people living in towns with more than 2,500 inhabitants – which is the standard 
definition of a town in France (see Pumain and Guérin-Pace, 1990) - and the proportion of 
people living in the 3 largest cities in the département. We control alternatively for each of 
these two measures of urbanisation in order to make sure that our results are not due to 
changes in the urban structure of the French départements that would be correlated with the 
presence of phylloxera. Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Appendix 
Table A1. 
 
                                                 
19
 The 5-year moving averages are computed around census years.  
20
 See Pumain and Riandey (1986) for a thorough description of the data. 
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4. The time-pattern of the effects of the phylloxera epidemic on wine production and 
crime rates 
We start our empirical analysis of the effect of the phylloxera crisis by providing some 
evidence on the time-pattern of its impact on wine production and crime rates. In order to 
provide preliminary evidence on the short and long-run effects of phylloxera, we estimate a 
fixed-effect model of the form: 
log	(	) = 	 +  + ∑  +

 	        (1) 
 
where d indexes départements and t indexes years, 	 denotes wine production and  are 
dummy variables for each cumulative number of years (τ) since phylloxera was first spotted 
in département d. The focus of equation (1) is in the estimates of the time-varying effects of 
phylloxera . Since this model only considers within-department variations over time, it can 
be interpreted as the average across-département difference in wine production relative to 
département average, when a département has been under phylloxera for 	years.  
Figure 6 reports the  coefficients as a function of the number of years since phylloxera was 
first spotted in the various French départements. It reveals an interesting time pattern. 
Consistent with historical records and historians’ accounts (see Garrier, 1989) the pest took 
some time to spread. On average, the parasite did not significantly affect wine production in 
the very first years after it was first noticed. In contrast, it turned out to have a strong negative 
impact in the decades following the one in which it was first spotted. The exact number of 
years before phylloxera substantially reduced wine production varies from one département to 
the other. Since a common pattern does not clearly emerge, it would be very difficult to define 
a phylloxera indicator that would properly capture the speed of the epidemic spread. This 
would require making strong assumptions on the shape of the contagion process within 
départements. We thus choose to resort to a more neutral criterion and use as a cut-off point 
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the year when each département was fully contaminated by phylloxera. This criterion allows 
us to focus on the effects of the crisis at its paroxysm. We thus define our phylloxera indicator 
as follows: it is equal to 1 as soon as the département is completely affected by phylloxera 
and remains so until 1890, the year when the solution to the disease - discovered in 1888 - 
was implemented on the entire French territory.  
<Figure 6 about here> 
Figure 7 reports the coefficients estimated using the model described in equation (1) where 
 are now defined as dummy variables for each cumulative number of years since 
phylloxera fully contaminated department d. Once the aphid invaded the whole geographical 
unit, we observe a clear fall in wine production. 
<Figure 7 about here> 
In order to gauge the size and dynamics of the potential effects of full phylloxera 
contamination on crime rates, we estimate the following model that keeps the structure of 
equation (1). 
	 = 	 +  + ∑  +

 	         (2) 
where 	 denotes the crime rate of interest (violent or property crimes) and  are indicators 
of each cumulative number of years of phylloxera since the first year the départment was fully 
contaminated. 
Figure 8.A. reports the  coefficients in the case of property crimes while Figure 8.B. reports 
coefficients for violent crimes. The overall picture emerging from these graphs is that 
phylloxera had a positive effect on property crimes and a negative effect on violent crimes. 
Moreover, its impact on crime rates appears to increase with the number of years since the 
départements were fully contaminated, before levelling off eventually.  
<Figure 8 about here> 
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This graphical analysis is useful to get an idea of the timing of the effects of the crisis. The 
epidemic took some time to set up and the patterns of diffusion varied across geographical 
areas, but once the parasite affected the whole geographical unit, we observe a clear negative 
impact on wine production. As regards crime rates, the decrease in wine production seems to 
map into an increase in property crimes and a reduction in violent crimes. Interestingly, on 
average, phylloxera seems to reach its strongest effect both on wine production and on 
property crime rates between the 5th and 10th year after it fully affected départements.  
In order to estimate the average effects generated by the phylloxera epidemic and to allow for 
some robustness checks, we now present standard regression analysis. 
 
5. Average effects of the phylloxera epidemic 
In this section, we present the results of a set of standard regressions where our main 
explanatory variable is full contagion by phylloxera defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 
for all years between the year when a département was fully contaminated by phylloxera and 
1890, and 0 otherwise. Our baseline model is: 
 
	 = 	 +  + ℎ	 + 	          (3) 
 
where 	 is the crime rate of interest (either violent or property crimes or minor offences), 	 
and  are time and département fixed effects and ℎ	 is our phylloxera indicator 
defined above. This choice is driven by the fact that, as described in the previous section, we 
cannot use the year phylloxera was first spotted in a département as the cut-off point for 
contagion since the epidemic spread out slowly and in the first years after the aphid was first 
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spotted in a département, it did not entail a large shock on wine production.21  
5.1 Phylloxera and wine production 
Before presenting reduced form estimates of the impact of our phylloxera indicator on crime 
rates, we assess the average impact of full contamination by phylloxera on wine production. 
We estimate the following model: 
log(	) = 	 +  + 	ℎ	 + 	        (4) 
where 	 denotes wine production. The results, reported in Table 1, show that full 
contamination by phylloxera generated a major decrease in wine production: it was on 
average 35% lower in the years of full contagion by phylloxera as compared to the reference 
period characterised by zero or partial contagion.22 In wine-intensive départements, defined as 
those départements where wine production amounted to at least 15% of agricultural 
production in 1862, the effect is even stronger since we observe a decrease in wine production 
by about 49 %.  
<Table 1 about here> 
These results show that the phylloxera pest provides an ideally strong exogenous shock on 
wine production. This shock turns out to be stronger than that generated by meteorological 
changes used in a number of papers in the literature (Chevet, Lecocq and Visser, 2011).  
5.2. Phylloxera and crime: baseline results
 
In Table 2 we present the results obtained when estimating our baseline crime equation (3). 
All specifications include time and département fixed-effects with standard errors clustered at 
                                                 
21
 Banerjee et al. (2010) use an alternative strategy to overcome the lack of common lag structure capturing the 
time span taken by the insect to spread out. They define a phylloxera indicator which takes value 1 when 
phylloxera has been spotted in the département and wine production is at least 20% lower than in the last pre-
phylloxera year. Although all our results are robust to this specification (available upon request) this does not 
appear as an appropriate solution in our case since wine production might be directly affected by crime rates thus 
introducing a reverse causality bias. 
22
 These results are in line with Banerjee et al. (2010) who find a 35 per cent drop in wine production using a 
different indicator of phylloxera. 
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the département level.23 Columns (1) to (3) report the results for aggregate crime categories 
over 1826-1936. As evidenced in column (2) phylloxera had a positive and significant impact 
on property crimes. Moving from zero or partial contagion to full contagion by phylloxera 
increased property crime rates by 1.326 per hundred thousand points, i.e. an average increase 
of +18%. This suggests that the negative impact of phylloxera on legal earnings opportunities 
dominated its potential damage to the quality of illegal activities. Although we do not have 
data on unemployment for 19th century France, these results are consistent with articles 
showing that the quality and quantity of legitimate employment opportunities are pro-cyclical 
and negatively related to crime rates (see Cook and Zarkin, 1985, and Mocan and Bali, 2010).  
<Table 2 about here> 
Interestingly, the opposite effect is found for violent crimes – see column (1): full contagion 
by phylloxera reduced violent crime rates by about 12%. As highlighted in the conceptual 
framework section, there exists a growing literature showing that: a) alcohol consumption is 
pro-cyclical and b) there is positive relation between alcohol consumption and violence. Our 
findings are consistent with this evidence: phylloxera contributed to lower alcohol 
consumption that reduced, in turn, violent crime rates. To further support this interpretation, 
we collected data on alcohol consumption at the national level for the period 1831-1936.24 
Based on this information, we run a regression of alcohol consumption at the national level on 
the proportion of départements fully contaminated by phylloxera in a given year. Results, 
provided in Appendix Table A2, show that, consistent with our interpretation, the spread of 
the phylloxera epidemic was associated with a decrease in alcohol consumption. In turn, 
alcohol consumption per inhabitant appears to be positively associated with higher violent 
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 Results are essentially unchanged when including department-specific linear time trends. They are also robust 
to double clustering at the département and year levels in order to take into account potential geographic-based 
spatial correlation in the spread of phylloxera (see Cameron et al, 2011).  
24
 Data on alcohol consumption at the national level are taken from Lederman (1964). Unfortunately, equivalent 
data are not available at the département level.  
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crime rates.25 This result is consistent with Traxler and Burhop's (2010) who showed for 19th 
century Germany that when rainfalls used to be particularly strong thereby generating an 
increase in rye prices – used to produce beer -, violent crimes went down. However, this 
negative effect vanishes once accounted for beer consumption. Together with our results, this 
suggests that, when hit by a negative income shock, people reduce their consumption, 
including that of alcoholic drinks. As a consequence, they engage less often in violent 
behaviour. As underlined by Melhum et al. (2006),26 "this is the likely channel that reduces 
violent crime".27  
In contrast, phylloxera does not seem to have affected minor offences – see Table 2, col (3) -: 
the coefficient on the phylloxera variable is insignificant at conventional levels.  
Evidence regarding more disaggregated types of crimes is consistent with these initial 
findings – see Table 2 - columns (4) to (9) – for the period 1826-1912. The impact of full 
contamination by phylloxera on homicides was negative, although not quite significant. In 
contrast, phylloxera increased the number of thefts per inhabitant – see column (5). The 
epidemic is associated with an increase in all the theft categories recorded in the data but it is 
significant at conventional levels only for domestic thefts (at the 10% level) and a residual 
category including, among others, violent thefts (at the 1% level). 
In order to check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the time window that we use, we 
re-run our main specification on a reduced time-span centred around the phylloxera epidemic, 
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 These results are significant at the 10% level only which is not surprising given the limited number of 
observations that we have (99). 
26
 Melhum et al. (2006) p. 373. 
27
 In contrast, alcohol consumption is unlikely to account for our results regarding property crimes. According to 
Carpenter (2007), "heavy alcohol use causes the commission of property and nuisance crimes". In the context of 
the phylloxera crisis, this suggests that property crimes should have decreased since alcohol consumption went 
down. This is not what we find in our data since phylloxera appears to have positively – rather than negatively – 
affected property crime rates. 
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i.e. 1850-1905. Results, reported in Appendix Table A3, are very similar to those provided in 
Table 2.28 
In order to better gauge the impact of the negative shock on wine production triggered by the 
phylloxera epidemic, we also run some IV estimates. We regress département-year crime 
rates on the log of département-year wine production instrumented by our phylloxera 
indicator - first-stage estimates are reported in Table 1 – column (1).29 The exclusion 
restriction underlying this empirical strategy is that phylloxera affected crime rates only 
through its impact on wine production. Table 3 reports the results for both aggregate and 
detailed crime categories. They are consistent with those presented in Table 2 and obtained by 
estimating the reduced-form equation (3). Wine production – instrumented by full contagion 
by phylloxera – has a negative and significant impact on property crimes (at the 10% 
significance level) and a positive and significant impact on violent crimes (at the 5% 
significance level). The IV coefficients allow us to estimate the elasticity of crime rates with 
respect to wine production. To the extent that wine prices did not vary much over the 
phylloxera period – as underlined in section 2.1 – they may be interpreted as elasticities of 
crime rates with respect to income arising from wine-related activities. Under this assumption, 
the elasticity of property crimes with respect to wine-based income turns out to be as high as  
-35%. The corresponding figure for violent crimes is +21% and 0.3% for minor offences – 
insignificant at conventional levels.  
<Table 3 about here> 
In order to better understand the role of local structures of agricultural production in our 
findings, we run difference-in-difference estimates in which we compare the impact of full 
contagion by phylloxera in départements where wine growing represented a large proportion 
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 More generally, all the results presented in the rest of the paper are robust to restricting the time window of our 
estimates to 1850-1905. 
29
 The estimates are run for the period for which we have information on wine production, i.e. 1850-1905. 
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of economic activity and in départements where this was not the case. As a first step, we 
interact our phylloxera indicator with the share of wine in agricultural production in 1862 - 
columns (1) to (3) in Table 4. Our results suggest that phylloxera had a larger impact on 
property crimes in départements where wine initially represented a large share of agricultural 
production. In contrast, the negative effect of phylloxera on violent crimes does not seem to 
vary according to the share of wine in agriculture. We also find a significant differential effect 
of phylloxera on minor offences in wine-intensive départements. Full contagion by phylloxera 
seems to have reduced minor offences in départements where the share of wine in agricultural 
production was initially very small, but this effect becomes positive for départements in 
which wine production was important. At this stage of the analysis, it is not easy to 
understand why the phylloxera crisis may have induced a decrease in minor offences in non-
wine-intensive départements. As suggested by further results presented in Section 5.3 (Table 
8) this may be due to the fact that, on average, judges in charge of minor offences became 
tougher, when départements got fully contaminated by phylloxera, whereas this did not 
happen for violent and property crimes. This may have generated a deterrence effect that 
dominated in départements which were not much dependent on wine-related activities. In 
contrast, in départements strongly dependent on wine, the effect of deterrence turned out to be 
smaller than the impact of the reduction in legal labour opportunities.  
<Table 4 about here> 
As a second step, we interact our phylloxera variable with the area planted in vines per 
inhabitant in 1862 - columns (4) to (6) – and with the share of people employed in agriculture 
according to the 1861 census multiplied by the share of wine in agricultural production in 
1862 - columns (7) to (9). This variable is a rough proxy of the proportion of the local 
population whose revenue is directly affected by wine production. Overall, the results are very 
similar to those obtained in columns (1) to (3): the impact of phylloxera on property crimes 
 27 
and minor offences is relatively more important in départements where wine represented a 
larger share of the local pre-phylloxera economy – except for property crimes in column (5). 
In contrast, the reduction in violent crimes following phylloxera does not seem to vary 
according to the initial importance of wine-related activities.   
Taken together, these results suggest that the negative income shock induced by the 
phylloxera crisis strongly affected French crime rates. It caused a substantial increase in 
property crimes while inducing a decrease in violent crimes probably due to a reduction in 
alcohol consumption.  
5.3. Discussion and Robustness Checks 
In the previous section, we provided evidence that the diffusion of phylloxera was associated 
with an increase in property crime rates and a decrease in violent crimes. We have maintained 
that the main channel driving our results is a negative shock on the income of people whose 
main source of revenue was related to wine production.  
Although we do not have information on income at the département level, we can estimate the 
correlation between the proportion of départements fully contaminated by phylloxera and real 
aggregate GDP. Results are reported in Appendix Table A4. They show that the more 
départements fully contaminated by phylloxera, the lower the aggregate level of total GDP 
and GDP per capita. This is consistent with the idea that the destruction of vineyards by 
phylloxera generated a major income shock in affected départements as already discussed in 
Section 2.1. 
In order to make sure that phylloxera does not capture the effect of other time-varying factors, 
one may want to include a number of control variables. Socio-demographic controls are 
natural candidates. Such variables are available for Census years only – see Data Section – so 
that we re-estimate our baseline equation for 5-year moving averages computed around 
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Census years – see equation (3). As a first step, we check that this new specification does not 
modify our findings. As evidenced in Table 5 – Panel A - columns (1) to (3) – our results are 
unchanged: moving from no-phylloxera to full contagion increases property crimes and 
reduces violent crimes in a significant way. Introducing controls for the share of males in the 
département population and for the age structure of the male population – see Panel A, 
columns (4) to (6) – yields virtually identical results. This is not much of a surprise given that, 
in order to bias our results, socio-demographic factors should have been correlated both with 
crime rates and with the expansion of phylloxera, which was indeed quite unlikely. 
Urbanisation may be a more serious concern if its intensity varied a lot across départements. 
Panel B of Table 5 controls alternatively for the share of the département population living in 
towns larger than 2,500 inhabitants – the standard definition of towns in France (see Section 
4) – and the proportion living in the three largest cities in the département. Both specifications 
leave our results unchanged: phylloxera still increases property crimes and reduces violent 
crimes. These estimates show that our results are not driven by major changes in socio-
economic characteristics.  
<Table 5 about here> 
Another concern could arise if full contagion by phylloxera generated migrations of 
individuals with specific characteristics. In order to check for this, we estimate the impact of 
phylloxera on changes in the share of specific demographic groups – in particular, men and 
young men – who are considered to be more likely to commit crime in the literature – see 
Buonanno et al. (2011) and Levitt and Lochner (2001) – and on the proportion of people 
living in urban areas where higher crime rates are usually observed (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 
1999). More precisely, we regress the change in each of the population variables between two 
Census years on the proportion of years the département was fully contaminated by 
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phylloxera since last Census.30 Results are reported in Table 6. They show that the intensity of 
contagion by phylloxera in a given period did not induce significant changes in the 
composition of the local population. This suggests that phylloxera did not induce significant 
migrations of individuals who may be more crime-oriented or living in areas where crime is 
more frequent. This evidence is consistent with the idea that the impact of phylloxera on 
crime rates was driven by changes in the existing population's behaviour rather than by 
changes in the population itself. 
<Table 6 about here> 
According to our interpretation, the positive effect of phylloxera on property crime rates was 
mainly driven by the deterioration of the quality and quantity of labour opportunities which 
induced a number of people to increase their amount of illegal activities with respect to legal 
ones. An alternative mechanism consistent with our results would be related to the response of 
the criminal justice system to crime. Reduced national and local tax collection during bad 
times may result in reduced budgets for police forces and a subsequent reduction in the 
capacity of the criminal justice system to contain crime. In order to control for this potential 
alternative mechanism we include police forces measured at the court-of-appeal level in our 
regression. Results are reported in Table 7. The coefficients on property and violent crimes 
are essentially unaltered with respect to the baseline results. This suggests that police forces 
are unlikely to have been endogenous, which is consistent with the fact that their allocation 
was mainly determined at the national level. This test allows us ruling out that our results are 
driven by a radical change in the presence of police forces at the local level as a consequence 
of the phylloxera crisis. 
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 This is the best we can do since demographic variables come from the Census and hence are available every 
five years only. Given this limitation, the proportion of years the département was fully contaminated by 
phylloxera since last Census captures for how long a département has been fully contaminated by phylloxera 
since the Census last took place: it is equal to 1 if full contagion has been observed for all years since last Census 
and to 2/5 = 0.4, for example, if full contagion has been observed for the last two years only. 
 30 
<Table 7 about here> 
Another alternative mechanism through which the phylloxera crisis could have affected crime 
rates is the behaviour of judges. During bad times, judges and juries could be more lenient 
toward those committing property crimes as they might justify misbehaviour as a 
consequence of the need to survive. If this were the case, the overall deterrence of the 
criminal justice system would be reduced as a consequence of the phylloxera attack. Note that 
in order for changes in leniency to account for our findings, judges should also have become 
tougher to people committing violent crimes. In order to check for this alternative 
explanation, we re-run our baseline equation with conviction rates as a dependent variable. 
Results provided in Table 8 show that our phylloxera indicator does not significantly predict 
conviction rates for violent and property crimes. As such, more lenient or tougher judges are 
not likely to account for our main results. 
<Table 8 about here> 
As evidenced in column (3), things are quite different for minor offences: the coefficient on 
the phylloxera indicator is positive and significant. As mentioned above, the deterrence effect 
generated by this change in judges' behaviour may account for the fact that full contagion by 
phylloxera induced a drop in minor offences in départements which were not much dependent 
on wine-related activities. The difference we find for conviction rates between minor offences 
and crimes may be explained by some institutional characteristics of the French judicial 
system. Violent and property crimes were judged by criminal courts in which juries were 
composed of randomly drawn registered voters who decided both on guiltiness and mitigating 
circumstances while professional judges were responsible for deciding sentences. In contrast, 
for minor offences, both jurors and court presidents were professional judges - appointed by 
the Ministry of Justice - who may have tried to counterbalance the potential effect of local 
economic conditions on minor offences.  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the effects of a large negative income shock on crime using a unique 
dataset based on 19th century French administrative crime records at the département level. 
Our case study focuses on the effects of the phylloxera crisis, which caused a major shock to 
the French economy at a time when it was still largely dependent on agriculture. We provide 
evidence on the effects of the spread of the phylloxera epidemic both on wine production and 
on criminal activity. Our results show that the phylloxera crisis generated a strong increase in 
property crime rates, plausibly driven by the impact of phylloxera on the economic conditions 
of those living in the affected départements. These results are robust to various alternative 
explanations including possible changes in the criminal justice system or in the local presence 
of police forces following the phylloxera crisis. Our findings are consistent with the standard 
economic model of crime and suggest that property crimes, and in particular thefts, tend to 
increase as a response to negative income shocks when holding constant the other 
determinants of the individual propensity to commit crime.   
Moreover, we show that the diffusion of phylloxera brought about a substantial decrease in 
violent crime rates consistent with the idea that the income shock induced a drop in alcohol 
consumption. This finding is in line with results by Melhum et al. (2006) and Traxler and 
Burhop (2010) who provide evidence of a reduction in violent crimes following the fall in 
beer consumption brought about by bad rye crops in 19th century German states.  
Our findings underline the fragility of economies that are heavily dependent on a given 
economic activity as were many French wine-producing regions at the time of phylloxera. 
This is not specific to the 19th century and investigating the impact of recent major 
downsizing events (for example in the automobile or steel sectors) or even municipality 
bankruptcies on crime rates in areas in which these industries (resp. local authorities) 
 32 
accounted for a large share of local employment appears as a promising avenue for future 
research.  
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Figure 1 The Diffusion of Phylloxera 
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Figure 2 - Phylloxera and Share of Wine Production in GDP, 1862-1890 
 
Source: authors' computations from Annuaire Statistique de la France (1946), Toutain 
(1987), Galet (1957) and Maddison (1995). 
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Figure 3 - Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle, 1869 
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Figure 4 – Violent and Property Crimes in France 1826-1936 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Minor Offences in France 1826-1936 
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Figure 6 – Impact of the diffusion of phylloxera on wine production - 
since phylloxera was first spotted in the département 
 
 
Years since phylloxera was first spotted 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Impact of the diffusion of phylloxera on wine production - 
since phylloxera fully contaminated the département 
 
Years since phylloxera  totally invaded 
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Figure 8 – Impact of the diffusion of phylloxera on crime 
Figure 8.A     Figure 8.B 
 
Years since phylloxera  totally invaded 
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Table 1: Impact of Phylloxera on Wine Production 1850-1905 
  
  Log (wine production) 
  Whole sample Wine-intensive départements 
Phylloxera - full contamination 
-0.349*** -0.487*** 
  (0.102) (0.119) 
      
R-squared 0.876 0.706 
F-Stat 11.71 16.75 
Observations 3,866 1,860 
Notes: (1) Information on wine production is available for 1850-1905. Over that period, 
once conditioning on having no missing values on phylloxera and wine production, 
sample size is 3,866. (2) Wine-intensive départements are defined as départements in 
which wine production represented at least 15% of agricultural production in 1862 (38 
départements). When considering only those départements, sample size goes down to 
1,860. (3) All specifications include year and département fixed effects (4) Robust 
standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (5) ***significant at 
the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2: Impact of Phylloxera on Crime Rates  
   
 
1826-1936 1826-1912 
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Homicides All Thefts Thefts in 
Churches 
Thefts on 
Country 
Roads 
Domestic 
Thefts 
Other Thefts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Phylloxera - full contamination 
-0.599*** 1.326*** -1.862 -0.134 1.354*** 0.0293 0.0312 0.305* 0.936*** 
  (0.179) (0.483) (27.03) (0.0878) (0.466) (0.0208) (0.0376) (0.162) (0.328) 
  
                  
R-squared 0.536 0.642 0.512 0.619 0.603 0.079 0.163 0.535 0.564 
Observations 8,639 8,639 8,639 7,038 7,038 7,038 7,038 7,038 7,038 
Notes: (1) Information on aggregate crime categories is available over 1826-1936 for 8,847 observations. When conditioning on having no missing values on the phylloxera variable, 
sample size goes down to 8,639. (2) Information on detailed crime categories is available for different time spans according to the category. In order to keep the period constant across all 
variables, we consider the shortest time period for which data are available for all of them, i.e. 1826-1912. Over that period, crime data are available for 7,208 observations. Once 
conditioned on having no missing values on the phylloxera variable, sample size goes down to 7,038. (3) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as the number of charged 
individuals over the total département population in a given year. (4) All specifications include year and département fixed effects (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the département 
level in parenthesis. (6) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 3: Impact of wine production on crime rates: IV estimates 1850-1905 
   
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Homicides All Thefts Thefts in 
Churches 
Thefts on 
Country 
Roads 
Domestic 
Thefts 
Other Thefts 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Log(Wine production) 1.019** -2.576* 24.95 0.0448 -2.209** -0.0462 -0.131 -0.530 -1.368** 
  (0.451) (1.374) (52.21) (0.207) (1.079) (0.0653) (0.102) (0.415) (0.687) 
                    
Observations 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 3,866 
R-squared 0.477 0.490 0.613 0.527 0.376 0.052 0.037 0.368 0.387 
Notes: (1) Information on all types of crimes is available for 4,597 observations over 1850-1905. Once conditioned on having no missing values on phylloxera and wine production, 
sample size goes down to 3,866. (2) All specifications include year and département fixed effects. (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (4) *** 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. (5) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as the number of charged individuals 
over the total département population in a given year. 
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Table 4 : Differential Impact of Phylloxera 1826-1936 
   
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Phylloxera - full contamination 
-0.765*** 0.209 -79.70** -0.518* 0.455 -70.24* -0.766*** 0.243 -59.90 
  (0.242) (0.644) (37.74) (0.271) (0.666) (41.72) (0.250) (0.745) (47.30) 
Phylloxera - full contamination* 0.724 4.896** 341.1***             
Share of wine in agricultural  (0.806) (2.316) (98.15)             
production 
         
Phylloxera - full contamination* 
      -0.615 6.580 516.6**       
Hectares of vines per inhabitant       (1.915) (4.397) (199.5)       
Phylloxera - full contamination  
*% of agricultural workers 
weighted by share of wine in 
agricultural production             1.262 8.225* 440.6* 
          
R-squared 0.536 0.642 0.513 0.536 0.642 0.513 0.536 0.642 0.513 
Observations 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 8,639 
Notes: (1) Information on aggregate crime categories is available over 1826-1936 for 8,847 observations. When conditioning on having no missing values on the phylloxera 
variable, sample size goes down to 8,639. (2) All specifications include year and département fixed effects. (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in 
parenthesis. (4) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. (5) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as 
the number of charged individuals over the total département population in a given year. 
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Table 5: Impact of Phylloxera on Crime Rates Controlling for Socio-Demographic Structure and Urbanisation 1851-1911 
(5-year moving averages ) 
  Violent Crimes Property Crimes 
Minor 
Offences Violent Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: with socio-demographic controls             
              
Phylloxera - full contamination -0.473*** 0.913** -15.82 -0.550*** 1.115*** -29.28 
  (0.173) (0.385) (15.98) (0.169) (0.422) (19.10) 
              
Socio-demographic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
              
R-squared 0.676 0.749 0.625 0.679 0.757 0.640 
Observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 
Panel B: with socio-demographic controls + urbanisation           
              
Phylloxera - full contamination -0.561*** 1.105** -30.45 -0.547*** 1.116*** -28.93 
  (0.169) (0.419) (19.10) (0.167) (0.421) (19.14) 
              
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion of people in towns>2,500 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Proportion of people in 3 largest  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
towns in the département             
              
R-squared 0.681 0.758 0.646 0.681 0.757 0.643 
Observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 
Notes: (1) Crime and phylloxera variables are measured as 5-year moving averages around the Census years (i.e. 13 years spanning over 1851-1911) for which we have 
information on socio-demographic variables and urbanisation. Information on crime, socio-demographics and urbanisation are available for 1,364 observations over 1851-
1911. When conditioning on having no missing values on the phylloxera variable, sample size goes down to 1,332. (2) In each crime category, dependent variables are 
defined as the number of charged individuals over the total département population. (3) Socio-demographic controls include the proportion of males in the whole 
département population and the age structure of the male population (aged 15-19, 20-29, 30-39 years old and 40 years old and above). (4) All specifications include year and 
département fixed effects (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (6) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
*significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 6: Impact of Phylloxera on Socio-Demographic Characteristics 1851-1911 
   
  
Change in the 
proportion of men 
between 15 and 19 
years old 
since last Census 
Change in the 
proportion of men 
between 20 and 
29 years old 
since last Census 
Change in the 
proportion of men 
between 30 and 
39 years old 
since last Census 
Change in the 
proportion of men 
older than 40 
since last Census 
Change in the 
proportion of men 
since last Census 
Change in 
the 
proportion of 
people in 
towns>2500 
since last 
Census 
Change in the 
proportion of 
people in the 
3 largest 
towns in the 
département 
since last 
Census 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
% of years of full 
contamination by 
phylloxera  1.27e-05 -0.000435 6.81e-05 0.000589 -0.000155 -0.147 -0.169 
since last Census (0.000877) (0.00256) (0.00151) (0.00349) (0.000741) (0.174) (0.223) 
  
R-squared 0.038 0.069 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.255 0.243 
Observations 996 996 996 996 996 996 996 
Notes: (1) There are 13 censuses and hence 12 observations for each département for variables computed as "difference since last census". Our database contains 85 
départements. Moreover, Alsace départements only have 4 censuses (hence 3 observations here) before the 1870 war; Nice and the two Savoie départements have missing 
observations for 2 censuses since they were incorporated to France in 1860 only. So, overall our database contains 996 observations. (2) The explanatory variable is the 
proportion of years a département has been fully contaminated by phylloxera since last Census. It captures for how long a département has been fully contaminated by 
phylloxera since the Census last took place: it is equal to 1 if full contagion has been observed for all years since last Census and to 2/5 = 0.4, for example, if full contagion 
has been observed for the last two years only since Censuses take place every 5 years. (3) All specifications include year and département fixed effects (4) Robust standard 
errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (5) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 7: Impact of Phylloxera on Crime Rates, Controlling for Police Forces 
1843-1932 
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Phylloxera - full contamination -0.327** 0.862** -13.60 
  (0.136) (0.377) (17.88) 
        
Polices Forces Yes Yes Yes 
        
R-squared 0.559 0.628 0.571 
Observations 6,896 6,896 6,896 
Notes: (1) Data on police forces are available for 1843-1932 only. Over that period, 
the information on aggregate crime rates is available for 7,071 observations. Once 
conditioned on having no missing values of police force and phylloxera variables, 
the sample goes down to 6,896. (2) All specifications include year and département 
fixed-effects. (3) Standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. 
(4) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 
10% level.  
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Table 8: Impact of Phylloxera on Conviction Rates 1826-1936 
  
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Phylloxera - full contamination -0.204 -0.248 0.919*** 
  (1.202) (1.131) (0.310) 
        
R-squared 0.293 0.188 0.724 
Observations 8,585 8,447 8,639 
Notes: (1) Over the 1826-1936 period, conviction rates are available for 8,791 
observations for violent crimes, for 8,648 observations for property crimes and 
8,847 observations for minor offences. Once conditioned on having no missing 
values on the phylloxera variable, sample sizes respectively go down to 8,585, 
8,447 and 8,639. (2) All specifications include year and département fixed-effects. 
(3) Standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (4) *** 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level.  
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Number of Observations Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
    
Average time span between phylloxera is first spotted and full contamination (years) 62* 7.016 3.574 
    
Crime Rates (per 100,000 Habitants)       
  Violent Crimes 8847 4 .952 4.280 
  Property Crimes 8847 7.397 6.918 
  Minor offences 8847 537.890 355.771 
  Homicides  8847 1.376 2.757 
  All Thefts 8847 5.194 5.530 
  Thefts in churches 7208 0.109 0.271 
  Thefts on country roads 7718 0.235 0.464 
  Domestic thefts 7718 1.225 1.787 
  Other thefts 7718 4.104 3.938 
          
Conviction rates (%)    
Violent crimes 8791 64.450 19.138 
Property crimes 8648 71.627 18.058 
Minor offences 8847 90.758 6.545 
    
Police forces per inhabitant 7080 0.003 0.001 
    
    
Wine Production (in Hl) 3959 534,184 1,134,147 
Share of wine in agricultural production in 1862 87 0.151 0.143 
Area planted in vines per inhabitant (in hectares) in 1862 87 0.073 0.086 
Share of population employed in agriculture in 1862 87 0.582 0.136 
    
Socio-demographic controls     
% males in the population 1461 0.494 0.016 
 54
% males aged 15-19 years old 1461 0.084 0.014 
% males aged 20-29 years old 1461 0.154 0.023 
% males aged 30-39 years old 1461 0.137 0.018 
% males aged 40 years old and above 1461 0.357 0.046 
    
Urbanisation rates 
% of population living in towns >2,500 inhabitants  1930 27.583 18.375 
% of population living in one of the 3 largest towns in the département. 1930 20.235 17.001 
 
 
  
Note: this statistics is computed only for those départements which were contaminated by phylloxera at some point in time.  
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Table A2: Phylloxera, Alcohol Consumption and Violent Crimes at the national level 
  
Panel A     
  
Alcohol 
consumption 
Alcohol consumption 
per inhabitant 
  (1) (2) 
      
Percentage of départements fully 
contaminated by phylloxera -1,539* -0.412* 
  
(839.8) (0.226) 
  
    
Time trend Yes Yes 
  
    
R-squared 0.703 0.602 
Observations 99 99 
Panel B     
  Violent crime 
  (1) 
    
Alcool consumption per inhabitant 3.66e-06* 
  
(2.01e-06) 
  
  
Time trend Yes 
  
  
R-squared 0.828 
Observations 99 
Notes: (1) Alcohol consumption at the national level is available 
for the period 1831-1936. Once removed war years, this yields 99 
observations (2) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A3: Impact of Phylloxera on Crime rates: 1850-1905 
  
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Homicides All Thefts Thefts in 
Churches 
Thefts on 
Country 
Roads 
Domestic 
Thefts 
Other Thefts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Phylloxera  
- full contamination -0.359** 0.820** -24.79 -0.0203 0.715** 0.0217 0.0451 0.142 0.455** 
  (0.144) (0.343) (17.91) (0.0670) (0.281) (0.0208) (0.0335) (0.102) (0.212) 
  
                  
R-squared 0.622 0.618 0.616 0.663 0.557 0.070 0.101 0.461 0.508 
Observations 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 
Notes: (1) Information on all types of crimes is available for 4,597 observations over 1850-1905. Once conditioned on having no missing values on phylloxera, sample size 
goes down to 4,489 observations. (2) All specifications include year and fixed effects. (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (4) *** 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. (5) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as the number of charged 
individuals over the total département population in a given year. 
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Table A4: Phylloxera and aggregate GDP at the national level 
 
 
  Real GDP Real GDP per capita 
  (1) (2) 
    
Percentage of départements fully 
contaminated by phylloxera -10,130*** -224.4*** 
  (2,649) (57.28) 
  
    
Time trend Yes Yes 
  
    
R-squared 0.937 0.943 
Observations 98 98 
Notes: (1) Aggregate GDP data are provided by Toutain (1987) for the period 1831-1936 
except for year 1919 and war years. This leaves us with 98 observations (2) *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Data Appendix 
 
1. French départements 
In 1826 there were 86 départements the borders of which were defined during the French 
revolution. The main changes which took place between 1826 and 1936 were the following. 
In 1860 three new départements were created with pieces of land coming from the duchy of 
Savoy and the Nice county: Savoie, Haute-Savoie and Alpes Maritimes. They are included in 
our database from 1861 onward. 
In 1871 France lost the war against Prussia. The two Alsatian départements (Haut-Rhin and 
Bas-Rhin) became German as well as part of both the Meurthe and the Moselle. The parts of 
Meurthe and Moselle which remained French were merged into a new département called 
Meurthe-et-Moselle. As a result of World War I, the territory which had become German in 
1871 went back to France. A new département was created with the German part of Meurthe 
and Moselle and was called Moselle. Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin are included in our database 
from 1826 to 1869 and from 1925 to 1936. Given the impossibility to compare Meurthe, 
Meurthe-et-Moselle and Moselle over time we drop them from our data.  
The Belfort area was part of the Haut-Rhin département before 1871. Administratively, it 
became part of Haute-Saône from 1871 to 1922. It then became an independent département 
in 1922 under the name of Territoire de Belfort. Given this historical instability, we drop it 
from our data.  
 
2. Population 
The population of each département comes from the Census which is available for years 
1831, 1836, 1841, 1846, 1851, 1856, 1861, 1866, 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 
1906, 1911, 1912, 1921, 1926, 1931 and 1936. 
We compute yearly population by linearly interpolating observed population using the 
population growth rate between two consecutive Census years. Years with wars fought on the 
French territory are dropped (1870-1871 and 1914-1918). For years between Census and 
wars, we proceed in the following way. For years 1867 to 1869 and for 1913, we extrapolate 
the last Census population using the growth rate of the previous inter-Census period. For 
 59 
years 1872 to 1875 and 1920-21, we retropolate the next Census population using the growth 
rate of the following inter-Census period. The 1830 and 1848 revolutions had no noticeable 
impact on département populations.  
 
3. Crime data 
Crime data come from the Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle.  
For property and violent crimes as well as minor offences, data are available yearly over the 
whole sample period, i.e. 1826-1936 except during war periods (1870-1871 and 1914-1918). 
For the 82 French départements which were part of France during the whole period, these 
aggregate crime data are hence available for 104 years. For, Nice, Savoie and Haute-Savoie 
which became French in 1860, aggregate crime data are available for 62 years; and for Haut-
Rhin and Bas-Rhin which were not French any longer between 1871 and World War I, they 
are available for 56 years. This amounts to a total 8,847 observations. The same goes for 
homicides and the "all thefts" category.  
As regards, thefts on country roads, domestic thefts and other thefts they are available only 
between 1826 and 1923 which reduces sample size to 7,718 observations. For thefts in 
churches the number of observations is even lower (7,208) because of reduced availability 
(1826-1912).  
